Table of Contents for Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court
Table of Contents for
Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court
List of Figures and Tables
Preface
Acknowledgments
PART I: THEORIES OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING
1.Introduction
Plan of the Book
2.Seven Distinctions in the Literature
Distinction 1: A Psychological Metaphor vs. a Rational-Choice Metaphor
Distinction 2: Theories of Attitude Activation vs. Theories of Rational Choice
Distinction 3: Theories of Choice vs. Theories of Measurement
Distinction 4: Explaining Final Votes vs. Explaining What Final Opinion Is Adopted
Distinction 5: Explaining Just the Final Vote vs. Explaining All Five Stages of Decision-Making
Distinction 6: Theories of "Sincere" Rational Choice vs. Theories of "Strategic Rational Choice
Distinction 7: A "Status Quo" Policy vs. No "Status Quo" Policy
Conclusion
3.Assessing Previous Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making
The Pioneers: Pritchett, Schubert, and Murphy
Schubert's Attitude-Activation Model
The Attitudinal Model
Conceptual Problems with the Attitudinal Model
Other Issues Involving the Attitudinal Model
The Literature on Strategically Rational Justices
Conclusion
Part II: A FORMAL MODEL OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING
4.Why Formal Models?
The Role of Theories and Models in Empirical Research
Some Potential Benefits from Formal Modeling
Potential Costs and Other Criticisms of Formal Modeling
How Can We Be Sure that the Potential Benefits Exceed thePotential Costs?
Conclusion
5.Definitions and Assumptions
Lines, Points, and Utility Functions
The Status Quo Policy
Preferred-to Sets and Win Sets
The Number of Justices
An Informational Assumption
"Sincere" and "Strategic" Behavior
The Independence of Cases
Joining, Concurring, and Dissenting
Costless Opinion Writing
Conclusion
6.Coalition Formation and the Final Vote
When Can the Status Quo Policy Be Upset?
What Are the Constraints on the Set of Policies that Could Be Adopted?
What Policies do Different Majority Coalitions Prefer to SQ?
How Do Justices Behave When They Dislike the Majority Opinion?
The Agenda-Control Version
The Open-Bidding Version
The Median-Holdout Version
Comparison of the Agenda-Control, Open-Bidding, and Median-Holdout Versions
Is Agenda-Control Behavior Unstable?
Summary of Major Results
7.Opinion Assignment
Self-Assignment As an Opinion-Assignment Strategy
Alternative Opinion-Assignment Strategies
Opinion Assignment by a Justice Outside Wjmed(SQ)
Opinion Assignment by a Justice Inside Wjmed(SQ)
Opinion Assignment by a Minority-Side Justice
Would an Opinion Assigner Prefer Larger Coalitions?
How Much Does Opinion Assignment Matter?
Summary of Major Results
8.The Conference Vote
Different Kinds of Strategic Behavior from Different Kinds of Justices
Strategic Behavior by the Chief Justice
Strategic Behavior by an Associate Justice Who Could Become the Opinion Assigner
Strategic Behavior by a Low-Seniority Justice Who Cannot Become the Opinion Assigner
Strategic Behavior by a Low-Seniority Justice Who Cannot Become the Opinion Assigner
What If Everyone Behaves Strategically?
When Does the Chief Justice Self-Assign?
Will the Chief Justice Trust What Other Justices Say on the Conference Vote?
Summary of Major Results
9.Certiorari
Sincere Behavior on Certiorari Decisions
Strategic Behavior on Certiorari Decisions
"Aggressive Granting" and "Defensive Denial" When Justices Are Strategic
Summary of Major Results
PART III: FUTURE DIRECTION FOR THEORIES OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING
10.Empirical Implications
Understanding the Five Stages of Supreme Court Decision-Making
"Nonstrategic" or "Sincere" Behavior on the Supreme Court
Vote Switching between the Original and Final Votes
Problems of Empirical Measurement
Conclusion
11.Future Research
Do the Justices Have Perfect Information about Each Other's Preferences?
Do the Justices Always Have Clear and Fixed Preferences?
Are Supreme Court Cases Independent from Each Other?
Regular and Special Concurrences
How Many Issue Dimensions Are There?
Costly Opinion Writing
Extensions of the Model
Exogenous Preferences and the Impact of "The Law"
Broader Applications
Conclusion
Notes
References
Index