Excerpt from Chapter 1 for Uneasy Partnerships

ONE

Uneasy Partnerships

Thomas Fingar

China’s rise and increasing activism in the world during the past two decades have produced admiration, anxiety, and an avalanche of academic and journalistic analysis and speculation about China’s goals, actions, and intentions. Despite the large volume, amount of detail, and interesting insights produced by foreign and Chinese observers, the number of empirically based comparisons is small, and the cases examined are often so diverse that it is difficult to determine what is being compared and how to interpret their findings.¹ The net result is a collection of inconsistent judgments that call to mind the conclusions of the six blind men who touched different parts of the elephant. For example, depending on the study consulted, one learns that China has a grand strategy and a rather detailed plan that guide its foreign interactions or that it addresses problems and opportunities in an ad hoc and pragmatic way.² Other studies reach different judgments on the extent to which China acts as a status quo power or is determined to change the international order,³ has coherent and tightly coordinated policies or increasingly acts in ways reflecting the divergent interests of competing actors,⁴ or manifests a new-type foreign policy to achieve win-win and mutually beneficial outcomes or ruthlessly pursues its own objectives with little regard for the interests of others.⁵ Another dichotomy is that between analyses that emphasize historical continuities—the so-called Middle Kingdom syndrome—and those that focus on China’s communist authoritarianism and efforts to maintain party rule.⁶

Evidence can be found to support all these—and other—interpretations, but many of them are contradictory, and not all of them can be correct. More important, it is not obvious whether a particular course of action was intended to capitalize on a transient opportunity, ameliorate especially salient problems, restore China’s preeminence, or maintain communist rule. In short, the generalizations are not very helpful.

One reason for the disparate findings and generalizations about China’s international behavior is that analysts approach the subject using different perspectives and expertise. The different perspectives can be summarized as those that deduce and explain the actions of China and other countries from the laws and lessons of international relations (IR) theory, China-centric interpretations that focus on China’s goals and actions toward one or a few specific countries, and those that examine and interpret China’s actions from the perspective of the target or partner country.

International relations–based analyses and predictions of China’s goals and behavior focus on the nature and dynamics of regional and global systems. Most who write in this genre are IR specialists who do not claim to have deep knowledge of China or its policy-making processes. Their lack of deep knowledge about China is not regarded as a serious impediment because their system-dominant approach treats China as a generic rising power or, in more refined versions, as a rising power “with Chinese characteristics.”⁷ In this approach, the modalities of decision making in China (and elsewhere) are much less important than the dynamics of the international or regional system in which it operates. Objectives and behaviors associated with rising states, such as a tendency to perceive the actions of others as intended to constrain or thwart the rising state’s ascension to its “rightful” place in the regional or global order, are imputed to China, and Chinese actions are interpreted as evidence that it is behaving as a stereotypical rising power.⁸

The system-level analysis category can be further divided into “realist” and “liberal internationalist” subdivisions. Realists, like John Mearsheimer and Aaron Friedberg, generally interpret—and predict—China’s behavior as intended to regain supremacy in Asia and, ultimately, to challenge the United States for global leadership.⁹ Liberal internationalists like John Ikenberry, Bruce Jones, and Joseph Nye, in contrast, place greater emphasis on China’s increasing integration into the US-led global order and growing dependence on that order for the attainment of its developmental and political objectives.¹⁰

IR theorists and others who focus on the international system tend to assess China’s actions primarily in terms of its relationship with the United States and a small number of other major powers, and to interpret China’s interactions with other countries as extensions or manifestations of Beijing’s goals vis-à-vis the United States, India, or—in the first half of the period examined here—the United States and the Soviet Union.¹¹

A second genre of work on China’s global engagement is more China-centric and tends to explain Chinese policy and behavior in terms of the country’s history, culture, political system, domestic situation, and security calculus. Unsurprisingly, most who employ this approach are China specialists who build on their detailed understanding of the country.¹² In contrast to system-dominant analyses that emphasize universal factors, those by China specialists tend to focus on factors that are China-specific (although not necessarily unique to China), such as the nature of the political system, the importance of historical memory (and mythology) of China’s past greatness and “century of humiliation,” and increasing economic capabilities and requirements.¹³

China-centric analyses of China’s actions on the world stage assign different importance to specific factors shaping Chinese perceptions and policies but generally focus on what China is attempting to do, and why it is attempting to do it, more than on the objectives and actions of the countries that are the target of China’s attention. Implicitly, if not explicitly, China’s aspirations and actions are treated as independent variables, and the reactions of other nations are assessed as dependent variables. The result is often an unbalanced assessment that gives inadequate attention to the goals, strategies, and second- and third-order consequences of a country’s interaction with China.

The third and much smaller category of works on China’s engagement with the world consists of those written from the perspective of other countries or regions.¹⁴ For a China specialist, most of these works provide unsatisfactory descriptions and explanations of China’s objectives and policy calculus. However, and more important, they provide useful insights into the way the countries in question perceive China and its actions and what the other countries do to capitalize on opportunities resulting from China’s rise and to mitigate adverse consequences for their own interests.¹⁵

The chapters in this book attempt to redress this imbalance, in part by demonstrating that the countries that interact with China do not simply respond to challenges and opportunities from the People’s Republic. They have objectives of their own, sometimes leverage their relationship with China to entice or counterbalance third countries, and often seek to take advantage of spillover effects of engagement with China.

This volume builds on the insights of others who have examined foreign-policy dimensions of China’s rise by employing empirical approaches to discover, describe, and explain China’s interactions with key states in Northeast Asia during the period of “reform and opening” that began in 1979. Contributors to the volume have eschewed single-issue focuses, diplomatic history, detailed chronologies, archival research, interview-based approaches, and other methodologies in favor of approaches that synthesize insights from their own and others’ research to assess and explain what they regard as the most important drivers, characteristics, and trajectories of interactions between China and Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Soviet Union/Russia. The contributors do not explicitly assess or apply the approaches and findings of others or develop broad generalizations, theoretical models, or detailed predictions of how events will unfold in the future. Instead, they focus on three questions that, to the extent they can be answered, provide a basis for comparisons within and among regions, over time, and across issue areas. Those questions are:

• What happened?
• Why did it happen that way?
• What impact have China’s interactions with the countries studied had on China, the other countries, and the global system?

Taken together, the chapters provide the basis for addressing two additional questions:

• What patterns, trends, and trajectories can be discerned when comparing the findings of the individual chapters?
• Do the findings of the book suggest or support predictions about future actions and interactions?

The framework developed here is based on two key judgments about China’s priorities. One is that national security always has the highest priority even if it is not always identified as such. As used here, and in China, security is a compound and elastic concept that comprises the country’s ability to deter or in other ways manage actual and imputed threats from abroad, threats to internal stability, and at least some of the time, threats to continued rule by the Chinese Communist Party.¹⁶ Without security, in the analysis of Chinese officials, it is impossible to pursue other objectives.

The second-highest priority is rapid and sustained development. Development, or modernization, has been a Chinese priority for more than a century, but its elevation to the second position dates from the late 1970s. Modernization is seen as critical to the achievement of the prosperity and power necessary to ensure security, stability, and continued legitimacy of the regime. This implies that one of the principal considerations when Chinese leaders make foreign-policy decisions is whether a particular course of action or form of engagement with another country will assist or impede the quest for modernization.

This way of conceptualizing the Chinese calculus of decision posits that when thinking about whether, when, and how to engage with particular countries, two of the principal considerations are the nature and magnitude of the threat that they pose to China’s security (or what they can do to mitigate the threat from others) and whether a country can provide what is most needed at a particular time to sustain a high rate of growth and acquisition of advanced technologies. This might be summarized as consideration of what they can do to China and what they can do for China.

Geopolitics is a strong determinant of both the nature of the threat to China and the potential to assist China’s drive for development in specific ways. Thus, for example, countries located far from China generally pose less significant threats and have fewer historical issues with China than do countries located closer to China. The obvious and important exceptions are the United States and, particularly during the Soviet era, the Soviet Union. Similarly, the wealthiest and most advanced countries (in North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia) have the greatest ability to provide markets, capital, technology, and training. Nations in other regions have greater capacity to provide oil, timber, minerals, or other inputs to China’s economy.

Rationale for Focusing on a Single Region

Northeast Asia has been the most dynamic region of the world for four decades. Oft-cited indicators include sustained high rates of economic growth, increasing intraregional trade, and production and supply chains involving multiple firms and nations. Japan led the way, demonstrating what could be accomplished through participation in the rules-based economic and security order led by the United States. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea adapted Japan’s strategy to their own situations and achieved comparably impressive results. China learned from their experiences, capitalized on their achievements, and eventually became, by many indicators, the largest economy in the world. It also became a more integral, influential, and assertive player on the regional stage, rekindling historical concerns about China’s leverage, ambitions, and intentions.

The story of how Northeast Asia became the region of superlatives and, in many respects, the poster child for export-led growth, transitions from authoritarianism to more responsive and responsible political systems, and economic integration despite deep and often antagonistic historical memories is both instructive and important, but that is not the focus of this book. This is a book about the evolution of relations between China and its most important neighbors—specifically Japan, the two Koreas, and the Soviet Union/Russia—during the era of reform and opening that began in 1979.¹⁷ More specifically, the book examines how China’s quest for security and economic development; shared history; the capabilities, concerns, and objectives of China’s neighbors; and developments in the broader international system shaped perceptions and policy choices in each of the countries studied here.

China and the other countries discussed here have interacted with one another for thousands of years. They “know” one another very well, but familiarity is a source of distrust, dislike, and disdain. Natural and developmental complementarities create opportunities for cooperation and mutual benefit, but divided memories, different priorities, and deep suspicions shape and constrain interactions. Geographic proximity facilitates trade, cultural interaction, political influence, and armed conflict. People in all countries in the region are cognizant of their shared past but often focus on different aspects of their history, and sometimes remember events very differently.¹⁸ The extent to which history facilitates or impedes particular forms of interaction is a function of contemporary perceptions and priorities. Thus, for example, when Japan and China accorded high priority to increasing their economic ties, both emphasized cultural similarities and the advantages of proximity. But when either acted in ways that impinged on the other’s interests, the aggrieved party was quick to cite negative examples from the past.¹⁹ History and proximity influence but do not determine perceptions or the way each country prioritizes and pursues its interests.

Geography, history, and influences such as factor endowment and perceptions of what is possible shape but do not determine national interests and priorities. Interests are defined and prioritized by people. During the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong was the principal arbiter of the country’s priorities and the policies to pursue them. His choices proved disruptive, divisive, and detrimental to the attainment of declared security and developmental objectives.²⁰ After Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping and other “veteran cadres” determined that it was both possible and imperative to adopt a very different strategy to enhance China’s security and achieve the long-aspired goals of wealth and power.²¹

An important part of the new strategy was designed to address the so-called bad emperor problem by making it far more difficult for any individual to hijack the system as Mao had done repeatedly during the first three decades of PRC history. Chinese communist ideology had always espoused collective leadership, but Mao so dominated the system he led that doctrinal constraints proved totally inadequate. Although party leaders and documents eschew use of the term, what they sought and appear to have achieved was a more effective system of checks and balances.²² They also appear to have altered procedures in ways designed to impede dramatic policy shifts of the kind that characterized the Maoist era, when no policy remained in place long enough to make informed judgments about how well it worked or which adjustments were needed to enhance performance. The new system was designed to facilitate minor adjustments but impede wholesale changes. The third element of the new strategy was to adopt and adapt approaches that had proved effective in other Confucian culture states.

China’s new strategy, announced in December 1978 and immediately sloganized as “Reform and Opening to the Outside World” (or “Reform and Opening”), was actually an old—and proven—strategy pioneered by Japan and adapted successfully by Taiwan, South Korea, and others who became known as the “Asian tigers.”²³ The countries that had employed this strategy successfully were different in many ways, but all, like China, had been Confucian cultures, and all but Singapore were in Northeast Asia.²⁴ If countries that had been strongly influenced by Chinese culture could apply this strategy successfully, China could expect to do likewise. Moreover, the culturally similar and proximate countries that had already achieved success could, if given the right incentives, help China to succeed. One strand of analysis in this book traces the evolution of PRC efforts to engage its neighbors in ways that would contribute to China’s quest for rapid modernization and economic growth.

China’s quest for sustained development was—and is—Beijing’s highest national priority, but it was not the only determinant of how events transpired in Northeast Asia. As important, albeit somewhat more susceptible to redefinition and interpretation, are security considerations. During the era of reform and opening, China has perceived other nations and potential interactions through lenses colored by a deep sense of insecurity and victimhood attributed to real and imagined enemies. The sense of victimhood is reinforced by officially inculcated memories of how the country suffered during the “century of humiliation” from 1840 to 1949.²⁵ The quest for wealth and power through modernization and economic growth is driven, in part, by conviction than China must have advanced science and technology to support modern military capabilities, and that possessing a modern military is essential to deterring and defeating hostile intent imputed to Japan, the United States, and other historical or potential rivals.²⁶

As used here—and by Chinese officials—security is a multifaceted concept that subsumes direct and indirect military threats; threats to global or regional stability with the potential to affect adversely China’s access to markets, technologies, and particular commodities; and internal threats to stability, sustained growth, and regime legitimacy.²⁷ All three dimensions are relevant to China’s perceptions and policies in Northeast Asia. Party-controlled media and official statements try to strike a balance between reaffirming Deng Xiaoping’s judgment that war with the imperialist powers is inevitable but not imminent and can be delayed through diplomacy and deterrence, and reminding citizens of putative threats from the United States, Japan, and (until its demise) the Soviet Union. These direct threats are compounded by the US-Japan and US-ROK alliances that Chinese officials characterize as “remnants of the Cold War,” inherently detrimental to China’s security.²⁸

As Chinese leaders regularly assert, their developmental strategy requires a stable and peaceful international environment. Sustained growth requires ensured access to increasing volumes and varieties of commodity imports (e.g., oil, iron ore, agricultural products) and stable markets for Chinese goods. Success has enabled the Chinese government and firms to invest in “developing markets” on all continents, and growing requirements for inputs from abroad have made China increasingly vulnerable to supply disruptions in distant locales. Forty years ago, Beijing could be indifferent toward, or even supportive of, political unrest in the Middle East, for example. Heavy reliance on oil from the region changed that in ways that made the danger of instability there and elsewhere a matter of grave concern to Beijing and softened its once-rigid position on sovereignty, noninterference, and United Nations–sponsored peacekeeping operations.²⁹

The prospect of regional instability is also a concern with respect to Northeast Asia because of the number of situations with the potential to increase political tensions sufficiently to affect important economic relationships and, in the worst case, to escalate into military confrontation (e.g., cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan, tensions between the ROK and the DPRK and the North’s history of provocations, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute between China and Japan). Managing these situations has been a continuing challenge for Chinese diplomats and decision makers.

Threats to internal stability also have both direct and indirect, and global and Northeast Asia–specific, manifestations. All have potency because the two primary pillars of regime legitimacy are performance (i.e., meeting the needs and expectations of ever-more-demanding citizens) and nationalism. Anything that threatens the ability of the country to continue to grow at high rates is perceived as threatening the willingness of China’s increasingly well-informed, well-educated, and well-connected middle-class urban citizens to tolerate the downsides of Chinese-style modernization (e.g., corruption, inequality, air and water pollution, unsafe food, costly health care, many other quality-of-life conditions). As China attained upper-middle-income status, the challenges of sustaining high rates of growth and meeting public expectations became more difficult, and this translated into a sense of increased regime vulnerability, which required stronger measures to deter and suppress dissent. It also required increased diligence in managing relations with key economic partners, especially the United States, Japan, the ROK, and Taiwan.

Management of these and other crucial economic and developmental relationships is made more problematic by the fact that key partners have also been characterized as posing significant security threats to the PRC. Downplaying the imputed threat helps to preserve important economic ties but risks appearing to compromise China’s security and/or sovereignty, and that, in turn, jeopardizes regime legitimacy. Adopting a tough line in disputes with key economic partners plays the nationalism card to preserve legitimacy but risks diminution of investment, market access, and technology transfers. The situation of Chinese leaders is further complicated by the fact that public demonstrations in support of government positions defending China’s territorial claims or protesting military developments that could affect China’s security carry an inherent risk of morphing into demonstrations protesting government inaction on the myriad downsides of development already noted. The challenges of managing relations in Northeast Asia are exceptionally difficult because of historical memories and animosities, and the critical importance of China’s economic links to countries that are aligned with the United States and perceived as posing potential or actual threats to China’s security.

Chinese perceptions and priorities are not the only factors determining the character of relations among states in the region. Each of the other actors has concerns and objectives with respect to China, sees dangers and opportunities in China’s rise, and has relationships with third parties that expand and/or restrain their options for dealing with the PRC.³⁰ Moreover, the perceptions, priorities, and policies of the other actors in the region have changed over time in response to changes in the international system, changing concerns and possibilities linked to China’s economic success and military buildup, and changes in their own internal situations (e.g., Japan’s prolonged economic downturn, democratic transitions in the ROK and Taiwan, DPRK acquisition of nuclear weapons, and successive changes in Soviet/Russian politics and priorities).

Changes in the International Situation

In the era of globalization, the “international system” is more than an analytic construct, because what happens in any part of the system can have significant consequences and implications for actors across the increasingly integrated and interdependent network of relationships. Three developments in the international system had significant impacts on relationships between China and the other countries in Northeast Asia during the period examined in this volume: the normalization of relations between the United States and China in 1979; the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991; and the consequences of “globalization” made possible by the computer revolution, the end of the Cold War, and the rules-based liberal international order.

China was a proactive actor in only one of these developments, namely, the normalization of relations with the United States that opened the door to China’s participation in the US-led system known at the time as the “free world.” In the other two cases, China—and other countries—had to adjust its policies in response to developments it had not initiated. Globalization has proved very beneficial to Beijing’s drive for modernization, sustained economic growth, and international influence, but it has also constrained China’s freedom of action by making it increasingly dependent on the global system into which it has been integrated. Opportunities and constraints resulting from greater interdependence and the nature of China’s economic and technical relationships with Japan and the ROK are a central part of the evolutionary story examined in this volume.

Later chapters examine specific consequences of US-China normalization in greater detail, but it is worthwhile to note a number of them here in order to illustrate the cascade effects of decisions taken for relatively narrow reasons. When Beijing determined that Mao’s quest for a self-reliant path to modernity had caused the PRC to fall increasingly far behind countries it considered potential threats to China’s security, and that it was prudent to abandon experimentation in favor of adapting a strategy that had proved effective in other Confucian culture states, it did so recognizing that this required closer relations with Washington than the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” relationship established by Mao and Nixon. To secure American support for Chinese participation in the system previously limited to members of the “free world,” Beijing determined that it must normalize relations and that this, in turn, required abandoning China’s long-held position on resolution of Taiwan-related issues. That cleared the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, which arguably reduced the military threat from the United States and its allies and made it possible for China to shift resources from the military to economic construction.³¹ These developments facilitated China’s rise, but that was not the only consequence.

The decision of the Carter administration to assist China’s drive to modernize via the reform and opening strategy provided direct and substantive benefits to China in the security and the developmental arenas. Symbolically, it signified that the United States did not regard China as an enemy and would provide access to American training and technology. Substantively, it ended the US Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China and relaxed export controls and other impediments to economic cooperation in ways that both responded to China’s announced priorities and helped Beijing to prioritize on the basis of what was immediately accessible.³² But it also brought critical indirect benefits by making clear to US allies in the region and beyond that Washington would not object if they too improved ties and deepened their relationships with China. Tokyo took steps to do so almost immediately after Nixon’s 1972 trip to China, but Seoul was not ready to begin exploring possibilities for economic cooperation until the late 1980s.

The most immediate and tangible of the indirect benefits came from Japan. Negotiations between Tokyo and Beijing to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship had stalled until Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski urged Japan to conclude the treaty after visiting Beijing in May 1978.³³ Japan had been eager to expand economic ties with China but was reluctant to do so without clear indication of approval from the United States.³⁴ As noted by Seiichiro Takagi in Chapter 5, normalization of relations between the United States and China cleared the way for aid, trade, and investment from Japan, arguably the country with greatest knowledge of what was needed to jump-start China’s economy.

The normalization of relations between the United States and China did not have the same immediate impact on either South or North Korea because China was not yet willing to put distance between itself and the DPRK, the ROK did not have what China most needed to modernize quickly, and Seoul was consumed by its own internal political turmoil.³⁵ The changed relationship between Washington and Beijing paved the way for later changes in China’s perception of and policies toward the ROK and the DPRK, but conditions were not ripe for (or did not require) substantive change until China made progress toward modernization and economic engagement, ROK political and economic evolution made it more able and willing to engage with China, and DPRK actions forced Beijing to respond. The chapters by Yu, Fingar, and Fingar and Straub examine key parts of this evolutionary tale.

The rapprochement initiated by Nixon and Mao was intended to catch the attention of the Soviet Union, and as demonstrated in the chapter by Artyom Lukin, it did. So did the derivative improvement in Sino-Japanese relations described by Seiichiro Takagi, which was interpreted in Moscow as evidence of a US-led effort to forge a US-PRC-Japan united front to contain and threaten the Soviet Union. Moscow responded by increasing its military deployments along China’s northern border and, later, attempting to improve its own relationship with Beijing.

Changes in Soviet priorities and policies during the Gorbachev era had a more immediate impact on relations in Northeast Asia than did the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. Gorbachev’s decision to reduce the number of Soviet troops deployed along China’s northern border and other steps to improve long-frosty relations with Beijing reduced the threat to China’s security in ways that validated Deng’s contention that China had a window of opportunity to pursue modernization because the external threat could be managed through deterrence and diplomacy. Moscow’s efforts to jump-start its own economy and improve relations with the West caused it to move away from the DPRK and toward the ROK. This triggered developments that led to the admission of both Koreas to the United Nations in 1991 and cleared the way for Beijing to recognize the ROK the following year.³⁶

Formal demise of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War at the global level but it did not lead to collapse of the DPRK, reunification of Korea, or immediate changes in relations across the Taiwan Strait. It did, however, remove the primary rationale for rapprochement between the United States and China, and for the US-Japan alliance. It was not immediately obvious or certain that the broader interests and ties that had developed in the US-China relationship would be sufficient to withstand the loss of a common enemy, especially in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Beijing appears to have decided that it was prudent to be more attentive to US concerns, especially on transnational issues.³⁷ Nor was it immediately clear whether or how the US-Japan alliance should be changed, or what should be done to prevent the appearance or reality of transforming it into an anti-China alliance.³⁸ This issue still has not been fully resolved, and China frequently condemns the alliance as an outmoded remnant of the Cold War, but Japan’s immediate response to the changed circumstances was to press ahead with efforts to assist China’s modernization and to demonstrate to Beijing that it had not become hostile because the common enemy had ceased to exist.³⁹

Russia under Boris Yeltsin had begun to distance itself from the DPRK, depriving Pyongyang of its traditional means to counterbalance China at a time when China’s strategy of development was beginning to produce impressive results. In response, Kim Il Sung, and later Kim Jong Il, began to explore possibilities for better relations with the United States, Japan, and even the ROK.⁴⁰ China, in turn, had to adjust to the now much more fluid situation on its border.

A third international development affecting China’s relations with its neighbors in the region was the process of globalization. Japanese companies were among the first to build multinational production and supply chains and were looking for new locales when China adopted the strategy of reform and opening. Proximity, cultural similarities, and natural complementarities made cooperation between Japan and China an attractive option despite historical legacies and deep animosity. As demonstrated in the chapter by Seiichiro Takagi, the Japanese felt both confident of their own economic prowess and a responsibility to make amends for the actions of imperial Japan. The chapter by Suisheng Zhao demonstrates that Chinese were willing to cooperate with Japanese firms for analogous reasons.

South Korea’s economic takeoff and readiness to participate more fully in globalization lagged those of Japan by approximately a decade, but by the late 1980s, Korean firms were eager to expand into China, in part to remain competitive with Japanese firms. This created new opportunities for China that proved attractive enough to change long-standing PRC policies toward both the ROK and the DPRK (described in Chapter 6). Although they are not examined in this volume, similar evolutions in the economies of Taiwan and China led to the establishment of economic ties that both required and facilitated changes in political relations.⁴¹

Interdependence is inherently a two-way street, and developments that made China increasingly dependent on Japan and the ROK also made the latter countries increasingly dependent on China. Actors on both sides of the dyads perceived the resultant situation as a source of both leverage and concern.⁴² Ambivalence about the consequences of economic interdependence increased after the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The direct financial consequences in Asia were considerably less than they were in North America and Europe, but their indirect and psychological impacts were significant. China was not affected immediately or directly because it had not participated in the practices that led to and exacerbated the banking collapse elsewhere. Many in and outside of China interpreted this to mean that China’s political economy and economic policies were demonstrably superior to those of the United States and the West more generally, and as another indicator that China was about to—or had already—displaced the United States as leader of the global system.⁴³ At a minimum, it increased Chinese confidence that they were on the right track.⁴⁴

The resultant and extended slowdown in the world’s two largest markets (the European Union and the United States) inhibited Japan’s recovery from its own prolonged recession. This compounded the psychological blow of losing its status as the world’s number-two economy to China, but it also underscored Japan’s growing economic dependence on China and concerns about Beijing’s ability to exploit economic leverage for political benefit.⁴⁵ But the economic relationship between China and Japan is interdependent, not unidirectional. With the slowdown in China’s other principal markets, it is more dependent on Japan, and this, in turn, constrains what either Beijing or Tokyo is willing to do in the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.⁴⁶ The slowdown in the United States and Europe also increased the importance of the Chinese market to South Korea.⁴⁷

Notes

1. The introductory section of this chapter is a slightly modified version of the introductory pages of the first book in a projected series of volumes examining China’s engagement with different regions since 1978. The first volume, edited by Thomas Fingar, is entitled The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). I decided to undertake this series because during the decades that I have studied China’s interaction with other countries, especially the fifteen years during which I supervised and edited assessments of developments in and interactions among all countries on all issues while a senior official in the US government, I thought that I observed patterns of behavior in China’s relations with other countries that varied by region and over time. The patterns appeared to result from changing Chinese assessments of the country’s security situation and changing requirements of its quest for economic growth and rapid modernization. In addition to its other objectives, this book represents an attempt to refine and test preliminary judgments and hypotheses about China’s priorities and calculus of decision.

2. See, for example, Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), chap. 1; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Thomas Christensen, “China,” in Strategic Asia, 2001–2002, ed. Richard Ellings and Aaron Friedberg (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 27–70; and Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 68–79.

3. See the analysis and citations in Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56; and Feng Huiyun, “Is China a Revisionist Power?” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2 (2009): 313–334.

4. See, for example, Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2009); and Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010).

5. See, for example, Su Hao, “Harmonious World: The Conceived International Order in Framework of China’s Foreign Affairs,” in China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power, ed. Masafumi Iida (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2009), 29–55; David Haroz, “China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 35, no. 2 (2011): 65–88, http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Haroz_FA.pdf; and “Relations with Myanmar: Less Thunder out of China,” The Economist, October 6, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21564279.

6. See, for example, David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Roderick MacFarquhar, “How Serious Is Xi Jinping About Tackling Corruption in China?” The Atlantic, June 28, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/how-serious-is-xi-jinping-about-tackling-corruption-in-china/277345/.

7. See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” National Interest, July–August 2011, 18–27, http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Friedberg.pdf.

8. Ibid.; and Stephen M. Walt, “How Long Will China Tolerate America’s Role in Asia?” Foreign Policy, December 2, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/02/whats_the_big_question_answer_the_us_and_china.

9. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–396; and Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).

10. See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); and Bruce Jones, Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014).

11. An exception by a scholar who is both an IR specialist and an excellent China specialist is Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015).

12. Examples include David Shambaugh, ed., Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013); Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); and Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

13. See, for example, Suisheng Zhao, ed., Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatic and Strategic Behavior (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

14. Examples include Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, eds., China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008); Robert I. Rotberg, ed., China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008); Ian Storey, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security (New York: Routledge, 2013); and Srikanth Kondapalli and Emi Mifune, eds., China and Its Neighbors (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010).

15. This chapter does not intend or pretend to provide a comprehensive summary of this vast literature. An overview of what has been written and the approaches adopted can be found in Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations.

16. See, for example, “Xi Jinping Expounds Security Commission Role,” Xinhuanet, November 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132892155.htm.

17. The choice of countries and dyadic relationships explored in this book reflects a conscious decision to eschew coverage of China’s interactions with “all” regional players in favor of examples that illustrate how Beijing’s perceptions, priorities, and policies are shaped by geography, history, economic and security considerations, third-country relationships, developments in the global system, and the objectives and actions of other countries. Including Taiwan and Mongolia would have increased the number of cases and provided additional detail about China’s relationships in the region but would not have changed bottom-line judgments about what shapes the goals and consequences of Beijing’s initiatives toward other countries and reactions to other country actions affecting China. Insightful books on relations between Mainland China and Taiwan include Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013); Steven M. Goldstein, China and Taiwan (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015); and Baogang Guo and Chung-Chian Teng, eds., Taiwan and the Rise of China: Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2012). Mongolia’s relevance to China’s security was a function of its relationship with the Soviet Union until 1992, and it has not been a major contributor to China’s quest for economic development and comprehensive modernization. For information on Sino-Mongolian relations, see Morris Rossabi, Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), chap. 9.

18. See, for example, Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds., History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (New York: Routledge, 2011).

19. See the chapters in this book by Suisheng Zhao and Seiichiro Takagi.

20. See Andrew G. Walder, China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

21. See Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).

22. Chinese communist political writers eschew or disparage the utility of checks and balances as that concept is used in American political writings, but many of the goals and mechanisms enshrined in writing on collective leadership aspire to limit the power of individuals. See John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963); and John Wilson Lewis, Major Doctrines of Communist China (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), chap. 6.

23. The new strategy is described at greater length in Chapter 2. See also Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

24. See Shiping Hua and Ruihua Hu, East Asian Development Model: Twenty-First Century Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2015).

25. See Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

26. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

27. This characterization is based primarily on analytic judgments but it is fully consistent with the announced responsibilities of the National Security Commission established in November 2013. See Yiqin Fu, “What Will China’s National Security Commission Actually Do?” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/08/what-will-chinas-national-security-commission-actually-do/.

28. See, for example, Timothy R. Heath, “China and the US Alliance System,” The Diplomat, June 11, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system/.

29. See, for example, Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto (New York: Routledge, 2013).

30. For a more extended discussion of the reasons that what happens in Northeast Asia and other regions are the result of interaction among multiple actors pursuing objectives vis-à-vis one another and third parties, rather than simply the result of Chinese policies to achieve Chinese goals, see Thomas Fingar, “China and South/Central Asia in the Era of Reform and Opening,” in The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, ed. Thomas Fingar (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), chap. 1.

31. See Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, chap. 11.

32. See, for example, Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992).

33. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principal (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1985), 218; and Chae-Jin Lee, “The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty,” Pacific Affairs 52, no. 3 (Autumn 1979): 420–455.

34. Disagreement over Beijing’s demand to include an antihegemony clause was the stated obstacle to conclusion of the treaty, and it no doubt was an important reason for the delay, but it ceased to be an insuperable obstacle after the United States urged Japan to finalize the agreement.

35. See Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

36. See Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014); and Oberdorfer and Carlin, Two Koreas.

37. See Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe, “Ties That Bind: Strategic Stability in the US-China Relationship,” Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 125–138; and Thomas Fingar, “China’s Goals in South Asia,” in The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, ed. Thomas Fingar (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), chap. 2.

38. See Ezra F. Vogel, “Japanese-American Relations after the Cold War,” Daedalus 121, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 35–60.

39. See the chapter in this volume by Takagi; and Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations After the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2014).

40. Oberdorfer and Carlin, Two Koreas.

41. See Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005).

42. See the chapters in this volume by Yu, Zhao, and Takagi.

43. See, for example, Pieter Bottelier, “China and the International Financial Crisis,” in Strategic Asia 2009–10: Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Andrew Marble, and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), 71–102.

44. See the chapter in this volume by Liru Cui.

45. See the chapter in this volume by Takagi; and Linda Sieg, “Analysis: Japan Dilemma as Economic Dependence on China Grows,” Reuters, September 2, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/02/us-japan-china-idUSTRE6810LQ20100902.

46. See, for example, Richard Katz, “Mutual Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China and Japan,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (July–August 2013): 18–24.

47. See the chapter by Myung-Hwan Yu; and Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), chap. 8.